Introduction

Program 6 puts philosophy to work in order to illuminate selected, often hotly debated, contemporary social problems and studies these problems to test widely accepted, and often cherished, philosophical ideas.
A common characteristic of many contemporary social problems is the uncertainty about the extent in which these problems are public affairs, and thus where, by whom and how they have to be dealt with in a liberal democracy. This is in particular pressing in questions about religious diversity and fundamentalism, biotechnology and modern medicine. Is genetic testing a matter that should be decided by individuals only, or should we expect democratic states, in spite of their longstanding commitment not to interfere in the life-plans of individuals, to develop policies that promote, or limit, the use of genetics-related medical technologies? Is the separationist interpretation of the relations between organized religions and the liberal-democratic state still defensible when manifestations of religious behaviour have become major issues of public concern?
In spite of their obvious differences in content, problems in areas such as mentioned before jointly call for serious reconsideration of political and ethical concepts that for a long time were perceived as unproblematic. At stake are the principles of liberalism and democracy, distinctions like the ones between the private and the public, fact and value, science and politics, and between individual morality and the normative neutrality of liberal democracies. Established institutions and practices to deal with public concerns need to be re-evaluated. These include the sovereignty of the national state, the autonomous individual as the basic unit in normative theory, the view that democratic politics is execution of aggregated individual preferences, and the role of expertise in democracy.

The political philosophy of liberal democracy is based on three doctrines that by now are subject to erosion.
(a) The sovereignty of the state, its supreme and comprehensive authority, is undermined by (1) globalisation and (2) a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, which manifests itself in an increasing displacement of politics from the traditional arenas of liberal democracy to a wide variety of sites where experts, civil servants and politicians meet. Both processes also challenge the ideal of representative democracy, i.e. the idea that legitimate policies emerge from procedures designed to constitute the collective will of the people;
(b) The public/private distinction is challenged by a.o. developments in technology;
(c) Finally, the idea that a modern, liberal-democratic state is neutral in the normative domain is challenged both by religious diversity (and in particular by the rise of politicized forms of Islam in the West) and by developments in biotechnology and medicine. Increasingly, we have to face the fact that the normative neutrality of the state is a myth and that, as all myths, it has unintended and unwanted side effects.
This situation leads to issues that simultaneously have practical political relevance and touch deep philosophical problems. Should the sovereign state and the autonomous individual remain the preferred basic units of normative theory? What does ‘democracy’ mean in a modern society that is increasingly confronted with problems that require expert-knowledge not only to find solutions, but also to recognize that there is a problem? For example, to seriously discuss what is widely perceived as one of the most pressing problems for the world in the 21st C, climate change, requires the knowledge, the models, and the language of expert-communities. To accept climate change as a political problem society has to cope with, thus requires for most citizens and their elected representatives to almost blindly trust experts and their models. How does the idea of representative democracy as the basis of legitimate government stand up to this fact? What does it imply for the models of social criticism and political rationality? To save the Enlightenment, do we have to abandon some of its most basic philosophical principles, such as the distinction between fact and value, and to reformulate the divide between the private and the public?

The Program’s members share an interest in issues in which philosophy becomes practical and practice philosophical. Research in the Programme is often case-based, with themes varying from immigrants, (Islamic) fundamentalism, to health care issues that emerge in areas such as genomics and organ donation. The Program combines conceptual and theoretical analysis in political philosophy and ethics, with empirical analysis from social sciences such as policy science, sociology, women’s studies and social studies of science, and with reflection on the nature and scope of philosophical and other forms of (e.g. literary) criticism.

Program's Staff

 Senior Tenured Staff
V. Bader, J. Bos, G. van Donselaar, G. den Hartogh, F. Jacobs, M. Leezenberg, B. Roessler, R. Sonderegger, K. Vintges1, G. de Vries.
Post Docs
- Funded by the Dept. of Philosophy: N. Marres
- NWO-funded: J. de Boer, M. Davidson, Y. Jansen, B. van Leeuwen, H. Wijsbek.
PhD candidates
- ASCA-funded: B. Hoorneman, E. Vink, J. Verburgt
- NWO-funded: M. Kanie, C. Kara.
- Funded by various other external sources: H. Dijstelbloem, D. McIntosh, D. Mokrosinska, F. Rebel, E. Tjong Tjin Tai.
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NB. M. Leezenberg, K. Vintges, Y. Jansen, M. Kagie and C. Kara also participate for part of their work in ASCA Programme 1.